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IMMUNITY OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTAL
INSTRUMENTALITIES
Prior to 1952 courts in the United States granted or denied immunity to
foreign governmental instrumentalities largely on the recommendations of the
United States Department of State.' Since this department did not have to
make public its reasons, its recommendations were open to the charge of being
prompted by shifting political considerations rather than settled legal rules.2 In
1952 the State Department expressly adopted the position that grants of im-
munity ought to be determined in American courts as they are in many foreign
I This practice has proceeded from the view that the immunity question is largely political
and within the peculiar competency of the State Department. See Republic of Mexico v.
Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 34 (1945), affirming trial court adherence to State Department request
for "recognition and allowance" of immunity on grounds that "[such disputes are properly
settled] through diplomatic channels rather than by the compulsion of judicial proceedings."
Accord: Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588 (1943); Compania Espanola v. Navemar, 303 U.S.
68, 74, 75 (1938); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 209 (1882).
2 This "abdication" by the courts has provoked controversy. For argument that such con-
troversies are not properly justiciable, see Dickinson, A Decade of Admiralty in the Supreme
Court of the United States, 36 Calif. L. Rev. 169, 215 (1948). Contra: Jessup, Has the Supreme
Court Abdicated One of its Functions? 40 Am. J. Int'l L. 168 (1946); Judicial Deference to the
State Dept. on Int'l Legal Issues, 97 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 79 (1948). One commentator suggests
that the "recognition and allowance" procedure violates due process. Cardozo, Sovereign Im-
munity: The Plaintiff Deserves a Day in Court, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 608, 613 (1954). See also
The Jurisdictional Immunity of Foreign Sovereigns, 63 Yale L. J. 1148 (1954).
But "abdication" may not be complete. Prior to 1945 federal courts did not invariably con-
form to State Department opinion. Berizzi Bros. v. S. S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926); 2 Hack-
worth, Digest of International Law 444, 445 (1941). Furthermore, while one commentator saw
in the Hoffman case, supra, decided in 1945, a hint that deviation from State Department re-
quest would never be repeated, Sovereign Immunity for Commercial Instrumentalities of For-
eign Governments, 58 Yale L. J. 176, 178 n. 15 (1948), that prediction has not materialized. See
Republic of China v. Nat'l City Bank, 208 F.2d 627, 630 (C.A. 2d, 1953) (Frank, J.), noted
in 47 Am. J. Int'l L. 321 (1953). The policy of "abdication" has been treated with similar scep-
ticism by state courts. See Frazier v. Hanover Bank, 204 Misc. 922, 923-24, 119 N.Y.S.2d 319,
321 (S. Ct., 1953), where jurisdiction was assumed over the Peruvian state trading agency in
the presence of State Department recognition and allowance, the court announcing that State
Department "advice... means no more than that Peru is recognized by the State Department
as a foreign sovereign."
Furthermore, courts seem to approve of State Department policy favoring foreign govern-
mental instrumentalities on a view that extending immunity insures similar treatment of
American instrumentalities abroad. Consequently, inquiry into immunity rules operative in
the jurisdiction of the foreign instrumentality seeking immunity is not unusual. The Pesaro,
277 Fed. 473, 475 (S.D. N.Y., 1921). See also Compania Naviera Vascongado v. S. S. Cris-
tina, [1938] A.C. 485,502-3 (Lord Wright): "Immunity may be taken to flow from reciprocity,
each sovereign state ... accepting subtraction from its ... sovereignty in return for similar
concession on the side of others. .. ."
This principle of "leverage by reciprocity" seems to have motivated the provision in the
Court of Claims Act to the effect that the right to recover from the United States is confined
to "citizens or subjects of any government which accords to citizens of the United States the
right to prosecute claims against such government in its courts." 15 Stat. 243 (1868), as amend-
ed, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2502 (1948). See similar provisions in the Suits in Admiralty Act, 1925, at
c. 428, § 5, 43 Stat. 1113 (1925), 46 U.S.C.A. § 141. Italian courts have urged a similar rule.
See Floridi c. Sovexportfilm, [1952] 75 For. Ital. I, 796, 806.
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countries, according to whether the instrumentality involved is "governmental"
or "proprietary."' 3 Since such a determination is viewed abroad as properly a
function of the judiciary, and since the "governmental-proprietary" distinction
is one which has long been applied by the courts in other areas, this announce-
ment appears to contemplate abolition of present State Department control of
immunity grants. In such an event courts face the problem of applying this
distinction in particular cases.
There are two relevant bodies of precedent to which courts might turn in
applying the new rule; the law of municipal corporations and cases from those
foreign jurisdictions which have adopted the restricted immunity rule in the
international area. Courts familiar with the governmental-proprietary test in
the area of municipal corporation immunity seem likely to resort to that prece-
dent in deciding international cases.4 A prominent authority has, in fact,
3 See letter of Jack B. Tate (State Department Acting Legal Advisor) in 26 Dept. of State
Bull. 984 (1952), declaring that the policy of the United States is not to grant immunity to
instrumentalities of foreign governments engaged in commerce in the United States. Allusion
was made to the widely adopted rule of international law to the same effect. For a comparative
study of immunity see Lauterpacht, 28 British Y. B. Int'l L. 250 (1951); Privileges of Sover-
eignty and L'Etat Commergant, 50 Am J. Int'l L. 478 (1956); Fensterwald, Sovereign Immu-
nity and Soviet State Trading, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 614 (1950).
The governmental-proprietary test has often been defined as requiring denial of jurisdic-
tion where the activity in question "is one in which only the government may engage (military
or diplomatic)"; jurisdiction is to be imposed where the operation is one "open to private
persons." The Jurisdiction Immunity of Foreign Sovereigns, 63 Yale L. J. 1148, 1161 (1954).
Advocates of this test argue that immunity should be restricted to preserving the foreign
state's political integrity but is inappropriate where the foreign government chooses to assume
the character of a private business. See Fensterwald, Sovereign Immunity and Soviet State
Trading, supra, at 620 et seq. (1950). The opposing, "absolute" immunity doctrine denies the
propriety of imposing jurisdiction regardless of the governmental activity involved and re-
gards all acts of the sovereign as qualitatively identical in that they further national interest;
it urges that forcing foreign governments to litigate in municipal courts imperils international
amity or aggravates an already inimical climate. Id., at 616, 617. American adherence to this
latter rule has historically been modified to impose jurisdiction on commercial instrumentali-
ties of foreign governments which have separated themselves from their governments by incor-
poration. See United States v. Deutsches Kaisyndikat Gesellschaft, 31 F.2d 199, 202
(S.D.N.Y., 1929); Coale v. Socigt6 Co-operative Suisse des Charbons, 21 F.2d 180, 181
(S.D.N.Y., 1921); Hannes v. Kingdom of Roumania Monopolies Institute, 260 App. Div. 189,
20 N.Y.S. 2d 825 (1st Dept., 1940); Molina v. Comisi6n Regoladora del Mercado de Henequn,
91 N.J.L. 382, 103 Atl. 397 (1918).
The immunity of governmental bodies from private suit (in both the foreign sovereign and
domestic municipality cases) may be viewed as presently evolving from the practice of gen-
erally granting absolute immunity, to that of denying private redress only in isolated circum-
stances. The first stage in this evolution appears to be adoption of the ministerial-proprietary
distinction as a palliative against the harsh effects of an absolute immunity rule. International
law seems to be in this stage. Destruction of this to allow wholesale private redress consti-
tutes the next evolutionary level. This appears to be the trend in the American law of munici-
pal corporations. See Seasongood, Municipal Corporations: Objections to the Governmental
or Proprietary Test, 22 Va. L. Rev. 910 (1936); Gardner, An Inquiry into the Principles of
Municipal Responsibility in General Assumpsit and Tort, 8 Vand. L. Rev. 753 (1955). For a
decision expressly abolishing the rule, see Hargrove v. Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla., 1957).
4The parallel has been noted without discussion in Fensterwald, Sovereign Immunity for
Commercial Instrumentalities of Foreign Governments, 58 Yale L. J. 176, 181 (1948).
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urged such an approach.' The analogy, however, presents certain problems.
Inasmuch as foreign instrumentalities probably do not engage in public
service enterprises where personal injury is a recurring and widespread inci-
dent, restriction of municipality immunity proceeding from fear of exposing
increasing numbers of citizens to unredressable personal injury seems inappli-
cable in the foreign instrumentality situation.6 Also, while abolition of munici-
pality immunity may dissipate business reluctance to deal with the municipal
corporation, a similar rule applied to foreign instrumentalities may deter de-
sired trade or investment by foreign governments.7 And finally, it is question-
able whether the argument made against municipal corporation immunity, i.e.,
that it promotes unfair competition against private local business, applies in
the international field.' Tariffs have historically been employed to protect
American business; further protection through limitations of immunity runs the
risk of further embarrassing the execution of United States foreign policy.
5 Bishop, New American Policy Limiting Sovereign Immunity, 47 Am. J. Int'l L. 93, 106
(1953).
6 Collisions involving ships of foreign state trading agencies have remained a recurrent
source of tort injury. Republic of China v. National City Bank of N.Y., 208 F.2d 627 (C.A.
2d, 1953). But a host of exceptions has operated to impair the absolute immunity rule in this
area. E.g. (a) The instrumentality must have been in possession of the ship: The Davis, 10
Wall. (U.S.) 15 (1870); Long v. The Tampico, 16 Fed. 491 (S.D.N.Y., 1893); The Fidelity,
8 Fed. Cas. 1189, 1191 (No. 4758) (C.C.S.D.N.Y., 1879); (b) The formalities for invoking im-
munity must be rigidly met. The Gul Djemal, 264 U.S. 90 (1924); The Sao Vicente, 260 U.S.
151 (1922); Ex parte Muir, 254 U.S. 522 (1921).
The few non-maritime personal injury actions brought against foreign instrumentalities
have been quasi in rem; see Mason v. Intercolonial Ry. of Canada, 197 Mass. 349, 83 N.E. 876
(1908). Foreign government-owned carriers, especially airlines, have traditionally incorporated
and have regularly been denied immunity under the recognized "incorporation" exception.
It may be that absolute immunity has been employed by commercial nations in hopes of
inducing reciprocity; such a policy implemented by those states risks little (loss of jurisdiction
in cases involving non-commercial states) and may achieve much (immunity for widespread
economic activities of such governments). Thus absolute immunity received its principal
expression in the courts of the great commercial powers: Germany, England, France (see
Lauterpacht, Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States, 28 Brit. Y. B. Int'l L. 220, 251 et
seq. [1951]), and Japan (Fitzmaurice, State Immunity from Proceedings in Foreign Courts, 22
Brit. Y. B. Int'l L. 101, 109 [1933]),while the restrictive approach was promulgated in Italy.
But as more nations increased their exports, lessened economic advantage and increased domes-
tic complaints caused wider adoption of the restrictive rule.
An American parallel may be discerned in legislation of the commercial states exempting
foreign banking and trust companies from the "doing business" provisions of the legislating
state, provided similar treatment is accorded the banking and trust companies of the legislat-
ing state in the forum of the foreign, corporation seeking the protection of the statutory
privilege. See, e.g., Ill. Stat. Ann. (Smith-Hurd, 1954) c.32, § 304.1-304.4.
8 Allen, The Position of Foreign States before National Courts Chiefly in Continental
Europe 301-2 (1933); Molina v. Comisi6n Regoladora del Mercado de Henequfn, 91 N.J.L.
382, 103 Ati. 999 (1918). The "unfair competition argument" seems tenuous, even as applied
to domestic instrumentalities. Although domestic competition does not enjoy the immunity
privilege, it is not burdened by concomitant business community reluctance to trade in the
presence of an immunity privilege. If it is suggested that reluctance is minimal because of
habitual self-restraint in exercise of the privilege, then competitive advantage seems similarly
minimal.
[Vol. 25
On the other hand, however, a number of reasons suggest the desirability of
restricting grants of immunity in the international field. While excessive invo-
cation of the immunity privilege by municipal officials is mitigated by the prac-
tical consideration of ultimate electoral responsibility, such a consideration
does not influence the foreign instrumentality." It may, in fact, be compelled
by domestic political climate to preserve "national dignity" by demanding im-
munity. Also, concern in the municipality situation to the effect that unlimited
responsibility to suit might result in bankruptcy and immobilization of govern-
ment"' seems irrelevant in regard to foreign instrumentalities. While attach-
able assets of a domestic municipal corporation are all likely to be within the
jurisdiction of the court, only a minute part of the assets of a foreign govern-
ment is susceptible to attachment, and the practical difficulties of proceeding in
foreign courts limit the value of simply obtaining a judgment." Since it would
seem that the differences stated above should be considered in labeling a foreign
instrumentality governmental or proprietary, caution should be used in applying
municipality precedent to the international field.
More relevant, perhaps, is foreign precedent exemplified by the Italian treat-
ment of the problem. While Italy was the originator 2 of the government-pro-
prietary distinction,13 modern expansion of the scope of accepted governmen-
tal activity forced Italian courts to adopt a different approach. 4 Instead of
' Consult Bishop, International Law (Casebook Series) pp. 451-55 (1953 ed.). Cf. con-
temporary assertion of immunity by Soviet government in Lorina v. The Rossia, (Civil
No. 18767, E.D.N.Y., 1948) litigated during a period of acute strain in Soviet-American
relations.
10 See Lloyd, Le Roi est Mort; Vive le Roil, 24 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 38 (1949); Borchard,
Government Responsibility in Tort, 36 Yale L. J. 1 (1926).
1 Even assuming the possibility of judgment, courts of almost all countries are hesitant
to permit execution. See Dexter & Carpenter v. Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen, 43 F.2d 705 (C.A.
2d, 1930) (surveying international practices regarding execution of foreign-state property); cf.
Nadelman, Non-Recognition of American Money Judgments Abroad, 42 Iowa L. Rev. 236
(1957). Even in Italy, where foreign immunity has been most severely curtailed, execution is
not readily obtained. See Hampspahn John c. Bey of Tunis (Court of Lucca, 1887), noted in
16 J. de Droit Priv6 335 (1889). See also Bussano, [19511 Giurisprudenza Italiana I, 695.
12But compare passages in Grotius, indicating his familiarity with the principle as applied
to the king and his immunity from "common law." "In this class of acts [buying, selling,
leasing, hiring] ... the common laws of the kingdom have... force, ... even the laws of the
town ... are of force ... [against the king]." Grotius, De Jure Belli et Pacis, c. 148.5, p. 116
(Whewell ed., 1853).
13 See Anzilotti, L'Esenzione degli Stati Esteri dalla Giurisdizione, [1910] Rivista Diritto
Internazionale 477; Quadri, La Giurisdizione sugli Stati Stranieri (Milano, 1940).
11 Under Article 10 of the Italian Constitution, foreign sovereign immunity is a proper
subject for determination under international, as opposed to domestic, law. But differing
national views of the proper scope of government activity made application of the provision
difficult. See Floridi c. Sovexportfilm, [1952] 75 For. Ital. 1796, where the court declared that
Article 10 was inapplicable because no ascertainable international rule existed. Although the
Italian court proceeded to apply the Italian view, i.e., that motion picture production is not
deemed an essential "governmental" function, it noted that imposition of jurisdiction in the
action by an Italian, non-policy-making employee would not undermine the independence of
the Soviet state. See also Pintor, Ferrovie Federali Svizzere c. Commune di Tronzano, [1924]
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asking whether the activity was normally the province of private capital, the
relevant test became: Does imposition of jurisdiction in the particular case in-
terfere with effective administration of the instrumentality?
Application of this rule has been as follows:
Sales contracts.-Jurisdiction should be assumed over suits against foreign
trading instrumentalities based on sales contracts, since the defendant cannot,
in such cases, urge that imposition of jurisdiction interferes with policy forma-
tion.15 The contract itself is the result of considered policy and enforcing it
executes rather than disturbs the decision-making function. 6 Where, however,
state policy not to be bound by its contracts against its wishes is expressed in
the contract or by treaty, jurisdiction should not be sustained. Argument that
assumption of jurisdiction impairs the sovereign's policy against being sued
seems invalid when such policy appears only at the time of trial and not at the
time of the execution of the contract; under such a view jurisdiction could never
be maintained against the wishes of the sovereign expressed in a claim of im-
munity at trial.
Torts.-The problem here is comporting untrammeled administration of gov-
ernment with the policy against denying redress for injury to individuals. Since
tort judgments may be heavy and unforeseeable, withdrawal of immunity
might produce budgetary difficulties. But Italian tort cases are tried before
judges and judgments are likely to be less substantial than jury awards, which
may be influenced by a feeling that governments, like insurance companies, can
always pay. Consequently, because of the lessened danger to effective admin-
istration, jurisdiction in tort cases is assumed. 7 The approach which New York
54 For. Ital. 1145, 1149, "But the proper classification of activities of foreign states is a matter
of international disagreement."
For the American opinion that the "governmental" or "proprietary" character of foreign
instrumentalities is determined by the economic system of the particular foreign government,
see Oliver v. United States of Mexico and National Railways of Mexico, 264 U.S. 440,442,443
(1924). Accord: The Maipo, 259 Fed. 367 (S.D.N.Y., 1919). But cf. The Roseric, 254 Fed. 154
(D.N.J., 1918).
1" See Onori c. L'Academia d'Ungheria,11956], 79 For. Ital. 1, 841 and annotation by Sereni.
1' Under this view, jurisdiction will be assumed even in cases involving military procure-
ment contracts. Canale c. Ministro di Guerra Francese, [1936] 63 For. Ital. 795 (denying im-
munity in damage action for breach of French army procurement contract). But cf. note by
Sperduti, [1953] 73 For. Ital. 795, 799 (pointing out that military contracts are included in the
traditional definition of "governmental" functions).
17 See Tani c. Rappresentivo Commerciale U.R.S.S., 71 For. Ital. 855 (1948). Resati c.
Rappresentivo Commerciale U.R.S.S., [1936] 63 For. Ital. 284; Ferrovie Federali Svizzere c.
Commune di Tronzano, [1924] 54 For. Ital. 1146.
But within the "irreducible minimum" of internationally acknowledged governmental
activity Italian courts will not assume jurisdiction. Lagos c. Carmonia, [1954] 37 Riv. Dir. Int.
111 (granting immunity to third secretary of Chilean Embassy for injuries caused by the
latter to an Italian citizen in an automobile accident). But cf. Balloni c. Ambasciatore del Cile,
[1936] 63 For. Ital. 284 (sustaining jurisdiction in a negligence action by an Italian citizen
against the Chilean ambassador for personal injuries resulting from plaintiff's being hit by the
ambassador's car driven by a diplomatic secretary).
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has been said to follow in domestic cases is similar; immunity is granted where
the injury involved is likely to be a recurrent incident of municipal operation,
which may be impaired by recurrent tort judgments. 8
Suits on employment conlracts.1'-These contracts present a double aspect:
beyond representing crystallized state policy, they may also define the rights
and obligations of persons involved in the determination of instrumentality
policy. 2° Thus, where decision-making personnel are plaintiffs, jurisdiction will
not be entertained because unfettered policy-making requires freedom to dis-
miss such personnel without fear of damage suits and their attendant notoriety,
and without fear of overly generous awards by local courts to local plaintiffs.2'
While the Italian approach is useful in that it attempts to deal realistically
with the danger of interference with the policy-making of foreign governments,
it may still permit the imposition of jurisdiction at what may be diplomatically
inopportune moments. Considering the size of American investment in attempt-
ing to create and maintain foreign good will, it seems unwise to jeopardize that
investment by permitting indiscriminate private interference in an area of
executive concern.
One proposed solution urges that wherever suits against foreign instrumen-
18 Lloyd, Le Roi est Mort; Vive Le Roil, 24 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 38 (1949), suggests that
refusal to allow suit against the municipality in Steitz v. City of Beacon, 295 N.Y. 51, 64
N.E.2d 704 (1945), where the city's failure to keep water hydrants in good repair resulted in
plaintiff's fire loss, followed from the court's unwillingness to subject the city to the heavy
claims which might proceed from this kind of negligence. The court expressed concern that
municipal liability in such cases might result in bankruptcy and consequent frustration of all
governmental objectives. But in McCrink v. City of Albany, 296 N.Y. 98, 71 N.E.2d 419
(1947), where failure of the police commissioner to remove a known drunkard and psychopath
from the police force resulted in the unprovoked shooting of plaintiff's decedent by the police-
man, the court denied immunity, the commentator's hypothesis being that the isolated charac-
ter of such willful acts insured against the danger of continuing the heavy claims. Lloyd, op.
cit. supra.
19 That peculiar jurisdictional problems are raised in employment contract actions has been
recognized by Italian jurists. Consult Sereni, Competenza Giurisdizionale dell'Autoriti Giudi-
ziaria Italiana nelle Controverse Relative ai Rapporti di Impiego, Dir. Comp. vol. 1, Fasc.
III (Roma, 1936).
20 Sereni, noting Onori c. L'Academia d'Ungheria, [1956] 79 For. Ital. 842, 845 (action by
Italian domestic servant against cultural exchange agency of the Hungarian government),
suggests that the criteria for ascertaining such personnel are, inter alia: (a) the duration of the
contract; (b) the possibility of advancement with progressive pay increases; (c) the professional
character of the job.
It should be noted that the "professional-non-professional" test does not require redefini-
tion at each national border according to economic system, and consequently avoids the con-
fusions of the ministerial-proprietary test.
21 Compare imposition of jurisdiction against claim of immunity by Russian Trade Dele-
gation in Corte d'Appello, [1932] 2 Riv. Dir. Int. Privato 64, where plaintiff was Italian, and
Russian Trade Delegation v. Kazman, [1933] 25 Riv. Dir. Int. 240. But it should be seen that
granting immunity against Italian plaintiffs might, as a practical matter, remove all possi-
bility of recovery. Further, Italian courts may not consider it unjust to force a citizen of the
nation operating the instrumentality to litigate in his native courts. Denial of jurisdiction in
such cases might also stem from a reluctance to interfere with foreign civil service machinery.
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talities threaten interference with State Department policy, the United States
should be impleaded at its request. Any judgment obtained against the foreign
instrumentality would then be satisfied against the United States, the latter re-
couping through diplomatic channels.2n In fact, recovery from the United States
also appears to be the just solution wherever immunity is granted; it would seem
unfair to make individual plaintiffs suffer in order to further United States
foreign policy.23
22 The jurisdictional Immunity of Foreign Sovereigns, 65 Yale L.J. 1148 (1954). I his would
require not simply the creation of a cause of action in favor of the foreign instrumentality
against the United States but also amendment of Rule 14(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure presently providing for impleader only at the instance of the plaintiff or defendant.
23 Sovereign Responsibility and The Doctrine of Sacrifice (Aufopferungsanspruch), 24 U.
of Chi. L. Rev. 513 (1957). This argument might, however, be limited to personal injury
claimants, on the grounds that persons contracting with foreign instrumentalities assume the
risk of immunity and can pass on the cost of such risk by adjusting the contract price. See
Jurisdictional Immunity of Foreign Sovereigns, 63 Yale L. J. 1148 (1954).
HOT CARGO CLAUSES
A labor union, unable to secure its demands by striking and picketing a pri-
mary employer,' may seek to intensify its pressure by organizing boycotts on
the part of employees of customers, suppliers, and carriers doing business with
the primary employer. Although this boycott technique was in general pro-
hibited by Section 8(b) (4) (A) of the Taft-Hartley Act,2 perplexing problems re-
sult when the basis of the boycott is a hot cargo clause, i.e., an agreement by
the secondary employer not to do business with employers stigmatized as "un-
fair" by the union.3
Section 8(b)(4)(A) makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to "induce
or encourage" employees to engage in a "strike or concerted refusal in the course
of their employment," the purpose of which is to force or require the employer to
cease doing business with another employer. It was early decided by the National
Labor Relations Board and by the courts that this section does not invalidate
hot cargo clauses. 4 And, although the Board later manifested increased hostility
I In a secondary boycott situation the employer involved in a dispute with the union is re-
ferred to as the primary employer. The employer whom the union attempts to induce not to
handle the primary employer's goods is called the secondary or neutral employer.
2 Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, at § 8(b) (4) (A), 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 158(b)(4)(A) (1956).
3 The typical clause states that it will not be a violation of the contract or cause for dis-
charge for the employees to refuse to handle non-union or "unfair goods." E.g., McAllister
Transfer, Inc., 110 N.L.R.B. 1769 (1954); Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 105 N.L.R.B. 740 (1953).
It is the union which designates what goods are "unfair" and consequently which employer is
to be boycotted.
4 International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Ameri-
ca, Local 294 v. Rabouin, 87 N.L.R.B. 972 (1949), aff'd Rabouin v. N.L.R.B., 195 F.2d 906
(C.A. 2d, 1952); Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 105 N.L.R.B. 740 (1953); McAllister Transfer,
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